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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 13-2565 
____________ 
 
ERICA PLASO, 
                                    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
IJKG, LLC; IJKG PROPCO, LLC, a/k/a Newco;  
IJKG OPCO, LLC, d/b/a Bayonne Medical Center 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cv-05010) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 21, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Erica Plaso appeals the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of IJKG, LLC; 
IJKG PROPCO, LLC a/k/a Newco; and IJKG OPCO, LLC d/b/a Bayonne Medical 
Center (collectively, BMC).  We will affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by the 
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District Court in its thoughtful opinion. 
I 
Plaso began working for MCR Martin, LLC, d/b/a Healthcare MCR (Healthcare), 
an Ohio-based consulting business, in January 2008.  She was hired by Healthcare’s 
President and Managing Partner, R. Brent Martin.  Plaso’s employment contract, which 
governed the terms of her tenure at Healthcare, provided that she would report to Martin, 
and that she “shall provide the Services as directed by [Healthcare] and in compliance 
with . . . the terms of the Client Engagement to which [she] is assigned.”  The contract 
obliged Healthcare to pay Plaso’s salary and benefits, and to reimburse her for expenses 
incurred when she worked at a client’s site.  It also authorized only Healthcare or Plaso to 
terminate her employment with the company. 
In February 2008, Martin assigned Plaso to work at Bayonne Medical Center, 
where he served as the Chief Restructuring Officer.  Plaso worked at BMC five days a 
week, and per BMC’s contract with Healthcare, interacted daily with BMC executives 
and employees.  She received unfettered access to the hospital, and was provided BMC e-
mail and telephone accounts, an access pass that identified her as a Healthcare contractor, 
and an office.  She also gave assignments to two BMC employees and was asked by BMC 
to evaluate them, but on Martin’s instruction did not do so.  During Plaso’s time at BMC, 
Martin was almost always on site, and she spoke and/or sent e-mails to him every day.  
  
3 
 
Martin established Plaso’s work hours, and she asked him for permission to take leave or 
to work from home.  Martin was the only individual to formally discipline Plaso while she 
worked at BMC. 
At some point, BMC formed a new physicians outreach group, BMC Medical 
Associates (BMCMA), and Martin assigned Plaso to serve as the group’s “practice 
administrator.”  In that role, Plaso represented BMC to physician practices in the 
community and trained BMCMA’s future Vice President of Business to perform these 
responsibilities.   
While Plaso spent the vast majority of her tenure with Healthcare assigned to 
BMC, she also worked for other Healthcare clients, including medical centers in 
California, Florida, Michigan, and Montana. 
According to Plaso, Martin began making unwanted sexual advances in 2008.  
Specifically, she alleged that he forcibly kissed her in June 2008, sent her sexually 
suggestive text messages in May and June 2010, and made inappropriate comments (i.e., 
telling her to wear “skirts only” at a work-related event, encouraging another co-worker 
in her presence to have sex with a BMC owner) throughout her time with Healthcare.  On 
June 24, 2010, Plaso complained to BMC’s Vice President of Human Resources, Jennifer 
Dobin, about Martin’s sexual harassment.  The same day, she informed Daniel Kane, the 
CEO of BMC, that she no longer wanted to work near Martin.  Kane then asked her to 
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return home and to avoid Martin while she packed up her office.  According to her 
deposition, Plaso believed that BMC would offer her employment, but her 
communications with Kane quickly ceased.  
Neither Martin nor Healthcare formally terminated Plaso, and she remained on the 
company’s payroll until October 2010.  In August 2010, Plaso filed charges against 
Martin for employment discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; she filed 
similar charges against Healthcare in October 2010 with the New Jersey Division on Civil 
Rights.  These claims were settled in October 2010.  
Almost a year after she settled her claims against Martin and his company, Plaso 
sued BMC in the District Court, alleging hostile work environment, quid pro quo 
discrimination, retaliation, and gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.  She also alleged three similar counts 
pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-
1.  These claims stem solely from Martin’s alleged sexual harassment. 
On May 14, 2013, the District Court granted BMC’s motion for summary 
judgment, finding that BMC was not Plaso’s “employer” for purposes of liability under 
Title VII and the NJLAD.  See Plaso v. IJKG, LLC, No. 2-11-cv-05010, 2013 WL 
2182233 (D.N.J. May 14, 2013).  Plaso contended that BMC had formed an employment 
relationship with her in one of three ways:  (1) as an employer; (2) as a joint employer; or 
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(3) as an “integrated entity” with her employer, Healthcare.  In a persuasive opinion, the 
District Court rejected all three of Plaso’s arguments, finding that Healthcare (not BMC) 
exercised control over Plaso’s employment and that Plaso offered “only speculation and 
conclusory allegations” to the contrary.  The District Court also found Plaso’s argument 
in the alternative—that BMC would be liable for quid pro quo discrimination, even if she 
were only an independent contractor—unavailing. 
Plaso filed this timely appeal.
1
 
II 
Plaso contends that summary judgment was improper because triable issues of 
material fact exist regarding her employment status.  First, she maintains that the District 
Court ignored key pieces of evidence in the record that are material to her status at BMC. 
 Second, Plaso argues that while the District Court properly identified the standards 
outlining the “employment” and “joint employment” relationships, it failed to apply those 
tests correctly.  Third, Plaso claims that BMC and Healthcare are part of an “integrated 
enterprise,” rendering it a single employer, and finally, that she is entitled to NJLAD 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo.  Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 
454 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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relief as an independent contractor.
2
  We address each argument in turn. 
A 
Plaso focuses on four facts in the record that she claims were ignored by the 
District Court.  First, pointing to testimony in Kane’s deposition, she alleges that Martin 
“structured” the environment at BMC and controlled how BMC employees interacted.  
Plaso thus urges us to draw the favorable inference that she, with whom BMC employees 
regularly communicated, was also a BMC employee.  The record undermines this 
argument, however, as Kane merely stated that Martin “structured” BMC’s interactions 
with Healthcare employees.  Martin did not control BMC; to the contrary, he supervised 
the manner in which Healthcare’s employees—including Plaso—interacted with BMC 
and the company’s other clients. 
Second, Plaso notes that she interacted daily with BMC executives and received 
assignments from them—indicia, she contends, that they “took part in controlling the 
manner and substance of [her] employment.”  She points to her increasing responsibility 
at BMC—as BMCMA’s “practice administrator” and her “supervision” of two BMC 
employees—as further material evidence of her employment.  These facts do not bear the 
                                                 
2 
In her complaint, Plaso alleged claims for quid pro quo discrimination and 
retaliation as an independent contractor under both Title VII and NJLAD.  Because she 
does not discuss the Title VII issue in her opening brief, she has waived that issue on 
appeal.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  
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weight Plaso assigns them; they merely highlight the nature of Healthcare and BMC’s 
contractual relationship.  Healthcare, as Plaso’s employer, assigned her to perform certain 
functions:  Martin outlined Plaso’s responsibilities, and BMC provided some direction 
within those functions in accordance with its contract.  For example, Martin informed 
Plaso that she would serve as BMCMA’s practice administrator, and he directed her to 
cease performing this function.  Similarly, Plaso declined to submit a performance 
evaluation for one of BMC’s employees at Martin’s direction.  That BMC provided some 
direction in the work assigned to Plaso by Healthcare does not raise a dispute of material 
fact as to whether she was an employee of BMC.  
Third, Plaso points to Martin’s role as BMC’s Chief Restructuring Officer as 
“compelling evidence” the District Court ignored.  In fact, the District Court  did address 
Martin’s role at BMC, finding that Plaso failed to present specific evidence as to how 
Martin’s job title would render her a BMC employee.  Furthermore, we have held that 
“mere nomenclature” is insufficient to demonstrate a supervisory relationship.  See 
Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 453 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Parkins v. Civil 
Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir. 1998)), overruled on other 
grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  Although it 
sheds light on the significance of his work on behalf of BMC, Martin’s title does not 
compel the finding that he was a BMC employee.  
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Fourth, Plaso alleges that BMC considered her an employee when it demanded in 
unrelated litigation that her communications with BMC’s counsel were privileged.  This 
claim is unsupported by the record, which demonstrates that BMC and Plaso never agreed 
upon the basis of such a privilege.  Although Plaso’s communications with BMC’s 
counsel were ultimately treated as privileged, BMC’s counsel—despite Plaso’s insistence 
that she be considered a BMC employee—rejected this characterization.  
For the reasons stated, we reject Plaso’s argument that the District Court failed to 
adequately consider the evidence of record.  We next consider whether this evidence 
raises a genuine dispute of material fact. 
B 
In determining whether an entity is an “employer” for purposes of Title VII, we 
consider the factors articulated in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 
318, 323–24 (1992).3  The essence of the Darden test is whether the hiring party has the 
“right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.”  Id. at 
                                                 
3
 The court may consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors:  (1) “the 
skill required”; (2) “the source of the instrumentalities and tools”; (3) “the location of the 
work”; (4) “the duration of the relationship between the parties”; (5) “whether the hiring 
party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party”; (6) “the extent of the 
hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work”; (7) “the method of payment”; 
(8) “the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants”; (9) “whether the work is part 
of the regular business of the hiring party”; (10) “whether the hiring party is in business”; 
(11) “the provision of employee benefits”; and (12) “the tax treatment of the hired party.” 
 Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (citation and internal quotations omitted).  
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323.  We have held that courts applying Darden may focus on three indicia of control:  
(1) which entity paid plaintiff; (2) who hired and fired plaintiff; and (3) who “had control 
over [plaintiff’s] daily employment activities.”  Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved 
Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). 
Contrary to our holding in Covington, Plaso claims the District Court erred by 
focusing on those three indicia instead of applying all twelve Darden factors, nine of 
which she claims are in her favor.  We are unpersuaded, for as the Supreme Court stated 
in Darden itself:  “Since the common-law test contains no shorthand formula or magic 
phrase that can be applied to find the answer [of employment], . . . all of the incidents of 
the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.”  
Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (citation and internal quotations omitted).  The District Court 
engaged in a detailed, considered discussion of the three Covington indicia and, in a 
footnote, acknowledged the relevance of the other nine Darden factors.  It found, quite 
correctly, that Martin and Healthcare (not BMC) controlled Plaso’s employment and her 
daily tasks.  
Similarly, Plaso’s reliance on Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 
(D.C. Cir. 1973), is misplaced.  There, the D.C. Circuit held that a private nurse, who was 
retained and compensated by hospital patients, could state a claim under Title VII against 
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the hospital where he worked.  Id. at 1344.  Sibley sued for gender discrimination because 
the hospital would not refer him to patients requesting a private nurse whenever the 
patient was female.  Id. at 1339–40.  Plaso claims that Sibley was an “employee” by 
virtue of his physical presence in the hospital building, analogizing his situation to her 
case.  In fact, Sibley was deemed not an employee of the hospital, although he was 
protected by Title VII because the hospital blocked his access to employment.  Id. at 
1342.  This rationale does not apply to Plaso’s suit, as BMC had no authority to affect 
Plaso’s employment.   
Nor do we find that the District Court erred, as Plaso contends, in its joint 
employment determination.  Under Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723 (3d Cir. 1997), a joint 
employment relationship exists when “two entities exercise significant control over the 
same employees.”  Id. at 727 (citations omitted); see also Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982).  When 
determining whether an entity exercises significant control with another employer, district 
courts in the Third Circuit have assessed the following factors:  (1) the entity’s “authority 
to hire and fire employees, promulgate work rules and assignments, and set conditions of 
employment, including compensation, benefits, and hours”; (2) its “day-to-day 
supervision of employees, including employee discipline”; and (3) its “control of 
employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes and the like.”  See, e.g., Abdallah v. 
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Allegheny Valley Sch., No. 10-5054, 2011 WL 344079, *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2011); 
Butterbaugh v. Chertoff, 479 F. Supp. 2d 485, 491 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Cella v. Villanova 
Univ., No. 01-7181, 2003 WL 329147, *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2003).  Here, the District 
Court reviewed these three factors, noting that only Healthcare paid Plaso’s salary and 
business expenses, maintained employee records for her, and had the authority to 
terminate her.  In addition, Martin outlined Plaso’s day-to-day responsibilities, controlled 
how she could use BMC resources, and told her when to work.  On the other hand, as the 
District Court aptly found, Kane and other BMC employees exercised only limited 
supervision over Plaso, which did not create a joint employment relationship. 
Plaso claims the District Court focused entirely on her employment contract, which 
set forth the original terms of her employment at Healthcare, and thus failed to consider 
the evolution of her role and her increasing responsibilities at BMC.  Again, she 
references her duties as program administrator for BMCMA, and she further argues that 
Kane “ultimately terminated” her employment.   
As discussed above, however, the record demonstrates that Plaso’s tenure as 
program administrator fell within her contractual duties as a Healthcare employee.  
Martin assigned her to the position, outlined her responsibilities, and instructed her when 
to stop performing that role.  When Kane and other employees interacted with Plaso and 
offered feedback on her work, they did so within the confines of her assigned functions.  
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The District Court correctly turned to Plaso’s employment contract as a touchstone for its 
analysis, but it did not do so to the exclusion of the other evidence in the record.  Rather, 
the District Court explained how Plaso’s work conditions at BMC—her constant 
communication with Martin, the fact that Martin controlled how she used BMC’s 
equipment, and Martin’s status as the only person to formally discipline her—comported 
entirely with the terms of her contract with Healthcare. 
Similarly, the record does not support the inference that BMC “ultimately 
terminated” Plaso.  Beyond mere allegations, Plaso offers no specific evidence that she 
was terminated, and for that matter, that BMC played a role in terminating her role at the 
hospital.  Though Plaso stopped working in June 2010, BMC presented evidence that she 
remained on Healthcare’s payroll until at least October 2010.  Thus, Plaso’s argument that 
BMC was her “joint employer” is unconvincing. 
Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s detailed consideration of 
Darden and Graves, respectively, and affirm its conclusions that BMC constitutes neither 
Plaso’s “employer” nor “joint employer” for purposes of Title VII.4 
                                                 
4
 Because the employment analysis under the NJLAD is substantially similar to 
that for Title VII, we also hold there is no genuine issue of material fact supporting 
Plaso’s contention that BMC was her employer or joint employer under that law.  See 
Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 600 (N.J. 1993) (holding that Title VII 
precedent is “a key source of interpretive authority” when construing provisions of the 
NJLAD) (citation omitted).   
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C 
Plaso also argues that the District Court erred in finding that BMC and Healthcare 
were not a single employer under the “integrated enterprise” theory.  Whether we should 
consider two entities as an integrated enterprise “rests on the degree of operational 
entanglement—whether operations of the companies are so united that nominal 
employees of one company are treated interchangeably with those of another.”  Nesbit v. 
Gears Unltd., Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 87 (3d Cir. 2003).  Relevant operational factors include:  
(1) the unity of ownership, management, and business functions; (2) whether the entities 
present themselves as a single entity to third parties; (3) whether the parent company 
indemnifies the expenses or losses of its subsidiary; and (4) whether one entity does 
business exclusively with the other.  Id.   
In our view, the evidence Plaso presents in support of this theory is legally 
insufficient.  As a threshold matter, Plaso did not allege in her complaint that BMC and 
Healthcare constitute a single employer.  Further, it is undisputed that BMC and 
Healthcare are independent legal entities, and Plaso has not proffered evidence that they 
                                                                                                                                                             
Plaso contends that the District Court’s succinct treatment of her NJLAD claim 
glossed over the multi-factored test for employment set forth by Pukowsky v. Caruso, 711 
A.2d 398, 404 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).  We do not find that a “principled 
application” of Pukowsky would yield a different outcome.  See id. at 405 (“We cannot 
perceive how the standards set forth in the federal cases could have been construed more 
broadly to warrant a different result [under the NJLAD].”).  
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are united in ownership, management, or purpose.  Although Plaso represented BMC to 
third-party physicians in the community in her capacity as BMCMA’s administrator, she 
did so as an independent contractor and not as a BMC employee.  Similarly, Healthcare 
performed its own administrative functions, as it maintained its own employee records, 
paid Plaso’s salary, and reimbursed Plaso for her business expenses.  Healthcare also 
served other clients, and indeed, Plaso was assigned to other medical centers during her 
time with the company.  Accordingly, Plaso cannot sustain her Title VII and NJLAD 
claims under the integrated enterprise theory. 
D 
Finally, Plaso maintains that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on her claims as an independent contractor under the NJLAD for quid pro quo 
discrimination and retaliatory discharge.  Perhaps because of the multiplicity of her 
claims, Plaso failed to alert the District Court to this NJLAD argument in her 
memorandum of law opposing summary judgment, instead discussing her quid pro quo 
discrimination and retaliation claims solely “in the context of a suit brought under Title 
VII.”  Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Summ. J. 25, Apr. 1, 2013, ECF No. 30.  Thus, the District 
Court reasonably looked only to Title VII.  However, because Plaso “offer[ed] only 
citations to the NJLAD and New Jersey case law . . . [and] no support for her conclusion 
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that pertains to Title VII,” it found her Title VII argument unpersuasive.5 
Plaso contends that this omission was a mere “typo” and that her NJLAD claims 
should be considered.  Even were we to accept this explanation, Plaso’s NJLAD 
arguments fail on their merits.  NJLAD’s goods and services subsection, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
10:5-12(l),  prohibits the quid pro quo sexual harassment of an independent contractor, as 
well as her discriminatory termination from a contract.  See, e.g., J.T.’s Tire Service, Inc. 
v. United Rentals N. Am., Inc., 985 A.2d 211, 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).  But 
the alleged sexual harassment at issue here was inflicted only by Martin, and Plaso has 
not articulated why BMC should be held liable for Martin’s conduct.  Further, as 
discussed earlier, Plaso has not offered evidence either that she was terminated or that 
BMC instigated the end of her tenure at the hospital.  As such, her NJLAD claims for 
quid pro quo discrimination and retaliatory discharge must fail. 
III 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                 
5
 Plaso has waived her claim with respect to Title VII.  See supra note 4.  
